We examine the factors behind rising income inequality in Europe's most populous economy. From 1999From /2000From to 2005From /2006, Germany experienced an unprecedented rise in net equivalized income inequality and poverty. At the same time, unemployment rose to record levels, part-time and marginal part-time work grew, and there was evidence for a widening distribution of labor incomes. Other factors that possibly contributed to the rise in income inequality were changes in the tax and transfer system, changes in the household structure (in particular the rising share of single parent households), and changes in other socio-economic characteristics (e.g., age or education). We address the question of which factors were the main drivers of the observed inequality increase. Our results suggest that the largest part of the increase was due to increasing inequality in labor incomes, but that changes in employment outcomes and changes in the tax system also contributed considerable shares. By contrast, changes in household structures and household characteristics, as well as changes in the transfer system only seem to have played a minor role.
Introduction
There has been a clear trend of increasing income inequality in industrialized countries over the past three decades, although with differences in the timing and intensities across countries (see OECD, 2008 OECD, , 2011 . This trend was first observed in Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United States, where pronounced changes in the wage and earnings distribution in the 1980s and 1990s sparked a large body of literature examining the possible causes of increasing inequalities in labor market returns (see, e.g., Bound and Johnson, 1992; Levy and Murnane, 1992; Murphy and Welch, 1992; Juhn et al., 1993; DiNardo et al., 1996) . Wage incomes, which have been the focus of many previous studies, are only one component in the considered here, but which did not attempt to quantify their relative importance for the overall development of the distribution (see, e.g., Hauser and Becker, 2003; Federal Government of Germany, 2008; German Council of Economic Experts, 2009; Grabka and Frick, 2010 ). An exception is the study by Peichl et al. (2012) , who provide an explicit estimate of how much changes in household structures contributed to changes in the German income distribution (they do not consider other factors, however).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an informal discussion of the development of the German income distribution and its possible determinants. In Section 3, we describe our methodological setup. Section 4 discusses some data and specification issues. In Section 5, we present our empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
Possible Sources of Increasing Inequality
As mentioned in the introduction, there was a significant increase in inequal- 1 In the following, we provide an informal discussion of possible factors behind these changes in the distribution.
Changes in Employment and Unemployment
As Figure 3 shows, the period 1999 to 2005 was one of steep unemployment growth. At the peak in 2005, there were almost 5 million registered unemployed in Germany. Figure 3 also shows that overall employment stagnated during the period 1999 to 2005. After 2006, employment started to grow significantly, while unemployment fell back to a level comparable to that in 1999. The fact that unemployment fell again after 2005 while inequality and poverty remained at their high levels suggests that the rise in unemployment is unlikely to be the only reason for the inequality increase between 1999 and 2005.
In addition to changes in unemployment, there were other changes in employment that may have influenced the distribution of incomes. Figure 4 displays the 1 Inequality stayed relatively constant before 1999 and after 2005 (see Biewen, 2000; Grabka and Frick, 2010) . Our income concept is yearly equivalized post-government personal income, which is calculated as the sum of income from all sources in a given household (including government transfers), net of taxes and social security contributions. The resulting value is then divided by an equivalence scale and distributed equally among household members. More details on the definition of our variables are given below. [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] part-time-steadily increased. The growth of these kinds of households even accelerated after 2005.
Changes in Labor Market Returns
A second possible source of increasing income inequality is increasing inequality in labor market returns. This has been the focus of many previous studies. The common perception is that the effects of skill-biased technological progress, which is seen as the main cause for the widening wage distribution in Anglo-Saxon countries since the 1980s (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Levy and Murnane, 1992; Murphy and Welch, 1992; Gosling et al., 2000) reached the German labor market with a delay. In Germany, wage inequality started to grow in a clear way from the mid-1990s onwards (Kohn, 2006; Gernandt and Pfeiffer, 2007; Dustmann et al., 2009; Antonczyk et al., 2010; Fuchs-Schündeln et al., 2010) . The evidence suggests that wage inequality increased both between and within skill groups, and that increases at the top are well explained by skill-biased technical progress, while increases in the lower tail of the distribution are better explained by additional factors such as deunionization and supply side effects (Dustmann et al., 2009; Antonczyk et al., 2010) . Figure 5 shows that growing inequality in labor market returns also translated into growing inequality of labor incomes at the household level. The figure displays the evolution of inequality in equivalized household labor income, i.e. in household labor income divided by an equivalent scale and equally distributed among household members. There is a clear trend of growing inequality, especially 
Changes in the Transfer System
In a highly developed welfare state like Germany, personal disposable incomes in Germany are to a large extent influenced by government transfers, especially at the bottom of the distribution. Changes in the transfer system may therefore directly affect the income distribution. In fact, a major set of labor market reforms, the so-called Hartz-reforms, was enacted in 2005. One of the key elements of the Hartz-reforms was the introduction of the so-called unemployment benefit II which replaced both the former means-tested unemployment assistance for the unemployed and social assistance payments for all other individuals who are (at least in principle) able to take part in the labor market.
The introduction of the unemployment benefit II for former recipients of unemployment assistance had a potentially substantial impact on the income distribution as the old unemployment assistance depended on the former income of the unemployed, while the new unemployment benefit II only provides a basic income independent of any former income.
2 Apart from these income reducing features of the unemployment benefit II, some population subgroups also benefited from its introduction. This was especially true of former recipients of social assistance who benefited from the slightly higher level of the unemployment benefit II, and individuals who, intentionally or unintentionally, failed to claim social assistance under the old system. In fact, contrary to the perception of the Hartzreforms as being antisocial, the introduction of the unemployment benefit II led to a major increase in government spending.
Another potentially inequality increasing feature of the Hartz-reforms was the reduction of the age-dependent maximum entitlement period for the unemployment benefit I from up to 36 months to generally 12 months (18 months for individuals aged over 55 years). As unemployment benefit I also depends on the former income of the unemployed, this typically leads to a substantial drop in income unless the person in question succeeds in finding a job.
Changes in the Tax System
As in many other countries, the German tax schedule experienced several changes between 1999 and 2008. The main changes are summarized in Table 1 . Tax rates were generally reduced, but reductions were somewhat higher at the top of the distribution. In 2007, the so-called "rich tax" took back some of the reductions for tax payers in the upper part of the distribution. Given that some of the changes were considerable, it seems likely that these changes had some impact on the final distribution of disposable income.
Changes in Household Structures
There are clear trends in the way household structures change in industrialized countries (see OECD, 2008, ch. 2) . In particular, there is a trend towards smaller households and towards untypical household forms such as single parents. The effect of the secular decline of household size on the income distribution in Germany is studied in Peichl et al. (2012) . Not explicitly considering other influences on the income distribution, they find that the effect of declining household sizes is moderate, even over a period of 20 years. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to account for such changes when studying the effect of other factors such as employment or labor market returns.
Changes in Other Household Characteristics
There are, apart from the household form, a number of other characteristics whose change over time may potentially influence the income distribution. These are in particular changes in the age structure of the population (increasing share of the elderly, and the decreasing shares of children and young persons), changes in educational qualifications (secular skill-upgrading), and other changes in the composition of the population, e.g. due to immigration. Again, it seems necessary to account for such changes when studying the effect of other factors such as employment or labor market returns.
Other Changes
We will capture distributional changes induced by factors other than the ones listed above in the "residual" of our decomposition analysis. It turns out that the unexplained "residual" of our analysis is limited so that the factors listed above successfully account for most of the observed distributional changes. One residual factor that is worth mentioning is inequality coming from households' capital incomes. There is evidence that inequality in household wealth increased over the period 1999 to 2005 (see Frick and Grabka, 2009; German Council of Economic Experts, 2009) , implying that capital incomes also grew more unequal. It turns out that inequality in equivalized capital incomes displays a similar pattern as inequality in equivalized labor incomes, i.e. an increase between 1999 and 2005, and a The basic idea of DiNardo et al.'s decomposition method is that of a shift-share analysis, in which observations are reweighted according to whether they are over-or under-represented in a counterfactual situation. These are combined with simulated changes of individual income components. Counterfactual situations are obtained by holding some aspects of interest fixed at the period 0 level, while changing others to the period 1 level. The method has its limitations in that it cannot account for interactions between the different factors in the form of behavioral reactions or general equilibrium effects. Despite these limitations, it is generally believed that counterfactual reweighting and simulation exercises convey important information about the main drivers of distributional changes. However, for the reasons mentioned, one must be cautious when interpreting the results in a strict causal way (for a general discussion of the limits of decomposition methods, see Fortin et al., 2010) .
Stage 1: Changes in the Distribution of Household Types
As a first stage, we consider the effect of shifts in the composition of the population with respect to a number of household types (we will distinguish between the six household types, see below). The counterfactual income distribution in which everything is as in period 0, but the distribution of household types is shifted to that of period 1 is given by
where y denotes net equivalized personal income, w1j is the population share of household type j in period 1, and f0j(y) the income distribution of individuals from household type j in period 0. Analogously, f0(y|th = 0) would be the factual income distribution in period 0, where w1j is replaced by the factual population shares w0j.
Stages 2 and 3: Changes in Household Characteristics and Employment Outcomes
The second and third stages of our decompositions account for changes in the distribution of household characteristics x (e.g., the age and educational composition of the household; see below for more details) and changes in household employment outcomes e conditional on these characteristics x. For example, the counterfactual income density for individuals living in household type j in which everything is as in period 0 but the distribution of household characteristics x and the distribution of household employment outcomes e conditional on these characteristics are as in period 1, is given by 
This means the counterfactual distribution f0j(y|tx = 1, te = 1) is just a reweighted version of the factual distribution fj0(y) with reweighting factors Ye|x, j and Yx| j. The factual distribution fj0(y) can be obtained by setting Ye|x, j = Yx| j = 1. Analogously, f0j(y|tx = 1, te = 0) with Ye|x, j = 1 is the counterfactual distribution where only the distribution of characteristics x is shifted to that of period 1 (while the conditional employment and everything else is held fixed at its period 0 level). Finally, f0j(y|tx = 0, te = 1) with Yx| j = 1 would be the distribution where only conditional employment outcomes are changed to the period 1 level, but everything else is held fixed at the period 0 level.
The reweighting factors Ye|x, j, Yx| j can be rewritten as 
Following Hyslop and Mare (2005) , we define household employment outcomes e as an ordinal variable (see below), so that reweighting factor Ye|x, j can be estimated using predictions from ordinal logit models P1j(e|x) and P0j(e|x). Analogously, reweighting factor Yx| j can be estimated using predictions from logit models Pj(t = 1|x), Pj(t = 0|x) and the ratio of observational mass in period 0 and period 1. 4, 5, and 6: Changes in Labor Market Returns, Transfers, and Taxes In stages 4 to 6 of our decomposition, we consider changes in labor market returns to household characteristics and employment outcomes as summarized in a vector z (stage 4) as well as selected changes in the transfer system (stage 5) and the tax schedule (stage 6). The vector of characteristics z is understood to include household characteristics x, household employment outcomes e, and suitable interactions between x and e. LetˆˆΔy 
where ygross,0 denotes period 0 market incomes from all sources, ytransf,1 are government transfers that possibly include counterfactual changes, ysscontr,0 are factual period 0 household social security contributions, and tax1(·) is the counterfactual tax schedule of period 1. If changes in labor market returns are not desired in the counterfactual situation, thenΔy lab is set to zero. Analogously, if changes in the transfer system are not of interest, ytransf,1 is replaced by factual transfers ytransf,0. Finally, if changes in the tax schedule are not considered, the counterfactual tax schedule tax1(·) is replaced by its factual counterpart tax0(·).
Using (7), we only predict changes due to counterfactual variations. Our reference point is always factual household net income ynet,0 = ygross,0 + ytransf,0 -ysscontr,0 -tax0. In this way we preserve as much as possible of the information on incomes and their heterogeneity as given in the sample. In short-hand notation, we express the changes to income in period 0 due to counterfactual variations as y y y tr t cf net lab
whereΔy lab ,Δtr,Δt represent the shifts due to counterfactual changes in labor market returns, the transfer system, and the tax schedule.
Counterfactual Densities Incorporating Stages 1 to 6
Combining equations (1) through (8) one can define counterfactual income densities that combine any desired set of counterfactual variations. For example, the overall income distribution in period 0 that results if household structures, employment outcomes, labor market returns, and government transfers are fixed at their period 0 levels but the distribution of characteristics x and the tax schedule are counterfactually set to their period 1 levels, is given by , , , , ) .
Following DiNardo et al. (1996) , counterfactual densities f0 (y|th, tx, te, tr, ttr, tt) can be estimated as 
where qi denotes the sample weight of individual i, nj is the number of individuals in household type j, K(.) a kernel function, h a bandwidth, and Yj = w1j/w0j. If a particular counterfactual variation is not desired, the corresponding weighting
| , is set to 1, or the corresponding shift factorsˆ, Δy lab i ,Δtr i ,Δt i are equal to zero, respectively.
Estimation of Inequality and Poverty Indices
Given an estimated income densityf y ( ), we use numerical integration methods to calculate the inequality and poverty indices shown in Table 2 (for the definition and properties of these indices, see Cowell, 2000) .
Statistical Inference
We compute bootstrap standard errors for all our decomposition results. These bootstrap standard errors correctly take into account the serial correlation of individual observations over time as well as their clustering in households. This is achieved by resampling from the universe of longitudinal household observations (see Biewen, 2002 for a discussion of these issues).
Data and Specification Issues
We base our analysis on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Our data refers to individuals (including children). We use all available SOEP subsamples and all our calculations are weighted with the appropriate sample weights. Our main income variable is real annual equivalized personal net income which is calculated from annual net household income. Annual net household income is given by gross income plus transfers minus social security contributions and taxes. Our dataset contains information on each of these components of net income. Taxes were calculated by the data provider, the DIW Berlin, using the official rules. For more details on the definition of the different variables, see Grabka (2009) . Our definitions are in general similar to the ones used in the official "Report on Poverty and Richness" (Federal Government of Germany, 2008) . There are two important differences, however. We do not consider imputed rental values and modifications to gross income due to differential treatment of population subgroups with respect to social security contributions.
In order to compute the individual income of the members of a given household, household net income is divided by the sum of equivalence weights defined by the OECD equivalence scale (the household head receives a weight of 1, additional household members over 14 years receive a weight of 0.5, and household members aged 14 years or less receive a weight of 0.3). In a robustness analysis, we consider two alternative equivalence scales to see whether our results depend on this particular choice (see below). Following recommendations and practice of the Statistical Office of the European Commission, we set the poverty line to 60 percent of the median of equivalized personal incomes in a given year.
As indicated above, we define six different household types: (i) single pensioner households (65 years or older); (ii) multiple pensioner households (at least one household member is 65 years or older and no household member is under 55); (iii) single adults without children; (iv) multiple adults without children; (v) single adults with children; and (vi) multiple adults with children. Our motivation for this classification is that it combines information on both the principal age composition and the structure of households, thus identifying population subgroups that share a similar economic and social position.
As further household characteristics x we consider the number of adults in the household, the fraction of female adults in the household, the fraction of adult household members with different educational qualifications (university degree, high school and/or vocational training, no such degree or qualification), the fraction of adult household members with non-German nationality, the fraction of adult household members with disabilities, the fraction of married adults in the household, the fraction of household members in different age groups (0-3 years, 4-11 years, 12-17 years, 18-30 years, 31-50 years, 51-64 years, 65 or older), and a dummy indicating whether the household resided in East Germany (see Table A2 in the Appendix for details).
Employment outcomes e are defined in an ordinal way: (i) no part-time or full-time workers in the household; (ii) no full-time workers but at least one part-time worker; (iii) one full-time worker but no part-time workers; (iv) one full-time worker and at least one part-time worker; and (v) at least two full-time workers. The category "part-time work" also includes marginal employment ("geringfügige Beschäftigung"). Category (iii) also includes the case where one individual holds a part-time or marginal part-time job in addition to a full-time job. The evolution of the share of individuals living in households with each of the six possible outcomes is given in Figure 4 . We estimate the probability for each household employment outcome e conditional on household characteristics x using ordinal logit models. All estimations are carried out for each household type separately (see Table A3 in the Appendix for details).
In order to estimate labor market returns, we regress log household labor income on household characteristics, employment outcome categories, and a full set of interactions. We drop regressors that turn out insignificant. Again, all regressions are carried out separately for each household type (see Table A4 in the Appendix for details).
In order to analyze the effects of the key changes in the transfer system, we simulate unemployment benefits II for former recipients of unemployment assistance and for former recipients of social assistance who are able to take part in the labor market. We also simulate the reduction of the maximum entitlement period for recipients of unemployment benefit I who will fall back to unemployment benefit II payments after the end of unemployment benefit I. We do not consider behavioral reactions to these changes in the transfer system. In this way, we will probably overestimate the distributional effects of these changes as individuals will typically try to take actions in order to make up for income losses incurred (in a related analysis however, Arntz et al., 2007 , suggest that taking into account behavioral reactions makes little difference). In the sensitivity analysis involving the years 2007/2008, we in addition take into account the introduction of a new parental leave benefit which was introduced in 2007. More details on the simulation of transfer changes are given in the Appendix.
The tax schedule is estimated using a flexible polynomial of third degree in household gross income along with suitable interactions with variables such as marital status or children (i.e., we regress the household tax variable as given in the data on a polynomial in household taxable income and interactions with other characteristics; results are available on request). The method of calculating taxes using regressions is also used in Frenette et al. (2007) , and can be seen as a parsimonious variant of micro-simulation. 4 The regressions are only carried out for non-zero tax values. A household pays no tax if its gross income is below the sum of personal tax exemptions. When calculating counterfactual tax values, we first check whether this is the case. We consider different kinds of personal tax exemptions including the rules for the (changing) taxable share of old age pensions as well as standard deductions for labor income, capital income, and insurance contributions. We calculate positive tax values using the estimated tax schedule only if household gross income exceeds the sum of personal tax exemptions and impute a value of zero otherwise. We note that, due to their complexity and due to the nature of our tax variable (which is at the household level) we are not able to replicate all the details of household taxation in Germany. Our regressions fit the tax values given in the data extremely well, making us confident that we use the correct tax schedule.The fit of our tax predictions (including zero predictions) as measured by the squared correlation between predictions and actual values is 4 For more advanced uses of micro-simulation methods for studying the effect of taxes on the income distribution, see, e.g., Bargain and Callan (2010) and Bargain (2012a Bargain ( , 2012b . These articles also discuss the possibility of decomposing the effect of tax changes into effects due to "fiscal drag," and other effects. This is an interesting question which we defer to future research. usually around 95 percent, with the exception of the smaller group of pensioners for which we obtain a fit of around 70 percent.
Finally, note that our analysis refers to inequality in net income between individuals, not households. All data are individual data but individuals are attributed the characteristics and the (equivalized) incomes of the households they live in. Incomes are expressed in year 2000 Euros (except for tax calculations which require nominal incomes). In order to minimize the outlier sensitivity of our regressions we exclude the bottom and top 0.5 percent of observations in our calculations. For expositional reasons we consider log equivalized incomes, which we appropriately transform back when calculating the inequality and poverty indices in Table 2 . We now consider "ceteris paribus" effects of the different factors, i.e. we change only one factor at a time to its period 1 level, but hold everything else fixed at the level of the base period 0. We believe that such an exercise comes closest to what one has in mind when asking about the "effect" of a particular factor on the overall change. For example, the bold line in Figure 7 shows the difference between the factual distribution in 1999/2000 and the income distribution that would prevail if the distribution of household types was changed to that of period 1, but everything else was held fixed at its period 0 level. The figure suggests that changes in household structures alone did not contribute much to the overall change in the distribution between 1999/2000 to 2005/2006. The overall density change is of the order of around 0.1 density points (see Figure 6 ), while the differences due to changes in household types do not exceed 0.01 density points. The fact that changes in the distribution of household types do not contribute much over a period of five to six years is not surprising given that demographic change is slow.
Empirical Results

Explaining Changes between 1999/2000 and 2005/2006
In a similar way, the difference in Figure 7 referring to "stage 2" confirms that changing only the distribution of other household characteristics to its period 1 level had an even smaller effect on the distribution. By contrast, the dotted line shown in Figure 7 relating to "stage 3" demonstrates that a ceteris paribus change in conditional employment outcomes leads to a noticeable redistribution of mass from the middle to the bottom of the distribution. This suggests that changes in unemployment and part-time employment affected particular individuals in the middle and lower part of the distribution. High income households (i.e., over 10.5 log-income points) appeared to be largely unaffected by such changes.
The bold line in Figure 8 shows the considerable effects of a ceteris paribus change in labor market returns on the distribution of incomes. The changes mainly affect the middle and the bottom of the distribution, but in contrast to the case of changing employment outcomes, the very top of the distribution is also slightly affected. The ceteris paribus effect of the transfer changes due to the Hartz-reforms are given by the dashed line in Figure 8 . The impact of these changes on the overall distribution seems limited, but as expected, there is a shift from the middle and the very bottom of the distribution to the area between the middle and the bottom. This is consistent with the view that the Hartz-reforms hit middle income earners by replacing income dependent unemployment assistance by the basic income (i.e., unemployment benefit II), and by cutting the maximum entitlement period for unemployment benefit I. On the other hand, households with very low incomes benefited from the introduction of unemployment benefit II as its level was slightly higher than that of the former social assistance, and more households were eligible. Finally, the dotted line in Figure 8 presents the ceteris paribus effect of changes in the tax schedule. These led to a considerable shift of the distribution to the right, but much more so for middle and especially for high incomes. 5 This suggests that middle and high incomes benefited overproportionally from reduced tax rates, while the density in the very low end of the distribution remained close to constant as these households usually do not pay any tax at all.
Our ultimate goal is to measure what percentage of the inequality increase between 1999/2000 to 2005/2006 can be accounted for by the different factors. Table 3 therefore summarizes what percentage of the overall increase as measured by various inequality and poverty indices can be explained by changing one factor at a time. The numbers largely confirm the findings from the graphical analysis. Only a relatively small percentage of the overall inequality increase can be explained by ceteris paribus changes in the distribution of household types (around 9 percent on average) or by changes in socio-economic attributes (around 3 percent on average). Ceteris paribus changes in conditional employment outcomes explain on average 29 percent of the total increase (column 3), which is a substantial contribution. Isolated changes in labor market returns account for an even larger share of the overall increase, namely on average 47 percent (column 4).
At -6 percent on average (column 5), changes in the transfer system have a slightly negative net effect on inequality (which is generally not significantly different from zero). At first glance, the finding that the effect of these reforms was inequality reducing rather than inequality increasing may seem surprising. However, as explained above, many individuals at the very bottom of the distribution actually benefited from the reforms (former recipients of social assistance and individuals who were not eligible before the reforms). Moreover, there was a shift of mass from the middle of the distribution to the area below the middle. Together, this resulted in an equivalization in the lower half of the distribution (see dashed line in Figure 8 ). Finally, it is well known that the reforms generally led to a major increase in government spending which exclusively accrued to the lower end of the distribution. Taken together, it is not implausible that the overall effect of the reform was in fact inequality reducing rather than inequality increasing. 6 As to the last factor considered in our analysis, ceteris paribus changes in the tax system account for an average 31 percent of the total inequality increase between 1999/2000 and 2005/2006 (column 6) . This is also a considerable effect.
The general conclusion is that changes in employment outcomes, changes in the tax schedule, and especially changes in labor market returns explain a major share of the overall inequality increase while changes in household structures, household characteristics, and the transfer system play a smaller role. Note that, due to the log-transformation, the graphs tend to overstate the importance of changes at the very top of the distribution. In a graph displaying densities of unlogged incomes, differences at the top of the distribution would be spread over fairly wide income intervals. 6 Using the same data, the related study by Arntz et al. (2007) obtains exactly the same result. We have to add one qualification to our and Arntz et al.'s result, however. As mentioned, the introduction of unemployment benefit II was accompanied by a slight increase in benefit levels for former recipients of social assistance. However, some of this increase was only meant to compensate for one-time payments that were a part of the old social assistance system but absent in the new unemployment benefits II. To the extent that former social assistance recipients did not report these one-time payments as income in our data, these individuals gained more in our analysis than they did in reality, overstating possible inequality reducing effects of the reforms. 
Notes:
The numbers in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors taking into account the longitudinal sample design, stratification, and the clustering of individuals in households. Source: SOEP, own calculations. 
Q90/Q10 Sequential Decomposition of the Increase in Inequality and Poverty A drawback of the ceteris paribus analysis presented so far is that the percentages contributed by each factor do not add up to the complete change and that nothing can be said about the importance of residual factors. We therefore proceed in the usual fashion (DiNardo et al., 1996; Hyslop and Mare, 2005) , and decompose the inequality increase 1999/2000 to 2005/2006 into a sequence of incremental changes that result when changes of the individual factors are accumulated. Forcing the sum of contributions to add up to 100 percent comes at the cost that the results may be path-dependent, i.e. they may depend on the particular order in which the different factors are sequentially changed, something which we address in a sensitivity analysis.
7 Given the shortcomings of both the ceteris paribus and the sequential decomposition analysis, our final assessment of the importance of the different factors will critically have to take into account all the available evidence from the different approaches.
Using ( ) − ( ) is split up into parts contributed by changes in the household structure (11), changes in household characteristics (12), changes in conditional employment outcomes (13), changes in labor market returns (14), changes in the transfer system (15), changes in the tax schedule (16), and an unexplained residual (17). Table 4 shows the contributions of each of the factors as a percentage of the overall inequality increase. For example, around 7.78 percent of the increase of the Gini coefficient from 1999/2000 to 2005/2006 is attributable to changes in household structures. The results largely reproduce the findings from the ceteris paribus analysis with the exception of the last two stages (transfer and tax changes). The effect of transfer changes is larger in magnitude, while that of the changes in the tax system is smaller when compared to the ceteris paribus analysis. The explanation is that in the sequential decomposition, changes in the transfer system are applied after employment outcomes (stage 3) and labor incomes (stage 4) are set to the situation of 2005/2006. As there are more low labor incomes and more unemployment in this situation, this increases the scope for effects of changes in the transfer system. Similarly, the effects of changes in the tax system may become smaller because low incomes are to a large extent exempt from taxes.
The unexplained residuals shown in the last column of Table 4 suggest that the six factors taken together generally explain around 80 percent of the overall inequality increase. Exceptions are the Q90/Q50 ratio for which the residual is negative, and the Theil index for which it amounts to around 27 percent. In the case of the Q90/Q50 ratio, this may be explained by the generally high variability of the results for this index which is also reflected in large standard errors. It is unclear why the standard errors for the Q90/Q50 ratio are larger than for the other indices, but this means that the results for this index are less reliable than for the other indices. The otherwise relatively small size of the residual suggests that most of the inequality increase is successfully accounted for by the factors considered above. The remaining residuals reflect the influence of rising inequality in capital incomes (see above) as well as all other unmodeled influences.
Sensitivity Analysis
In order to check how sensitive the sequential decomposition is with respect to the decomposition order, we calculated the decomposition for all possible orders. As a simplification, we treated the changes in the tax and transfer system as one stage, i.e. we considered orders in which the tax and transfer system were changed at the same time. This results in 5! = 120 different orderings. The results of this exercise are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. Although the averaged results convey a picture that is qualitatively similar to what we presented above, it turns out that there is quite a lot variability in the contributions of the different factors, depending on the decomposition order chosen. This calls into question the common practice of carrying out such sequential decompositions and makes it necessary to better justify why a particular decomposition order is chosen.
We give the following reasons why the order decribed in (11) to (16), is more plausible than other orders. First, in decomposition (11) to (16), factors are basically changed in the order of their "pre-determinedness," i.e. household type and household characteristics are chosen before employment outcomes, labor incomes are the result of household characteristics and employment outcomes, and taxes and transfers are the result of both labor incomes and household characteristics. Second, the order used in (11) to (16) essentially reproduces the contributions that result from the ceteris paribus analysis, which is appealing on a-priori grounds, but which has the disadvantage of non-additivity. We go one step further and claim that the ceteris paribus analysis is more informative with respect to the "effects" of We have also carried out further sensitivity checks, in particular we varied the bandwidth used in our density estimations and the equivalence scale used to make incomes comparable across household types. A combination of graphical inspection and Silverman's rule of thumb led us to use a fixed bandwidth of 0.175 throughout our analysis (Hyslop and Mare, 2005 use a similar fixed bandwidth). Our numerical results change only slightly if we vary the bandwidth between 0.1 and 0.3, and qualitative results remain unchanged. The same applies if we use two alternative equivalence scales (we used the so-called Luxembourg scale which deflates household incomes by the square root of household size, and another scale which assigns a weight of 1 to the household head, and weights of 0.7 and 0.5 to additional household members over 14 years, and up to 14 years, respectively).
Explaining Changes between 1999/2000 and 2007/2008
As another sensitivity test, we also carry out our analysis for The effects of changes in the transfer system (which now include the introduction of the new parental leave benefit) are still relatively small (slightly above zero in Table 5 , and slightly below zero in Table 6 
Q90/Q10 6. Conclusion This paper analyzed which of different possible factors were behind the recent increase in personal income inequality in Germany. Our contribution lies in the fact that, although possible reasons for rising income inequality in different countries have been discussed and documented many times, little is known about their quantitative importance. Such information is relevant from a policy point of view. For example, it is essential to know whether growing income inequality is a consequence of employment changes, or of inequality in labor market returns. Our results suggest that the conspicuous increase in inequality and poverty over the period 1999/2000 to 2005/2006 was mostly due to increasing dispersion in labor market incomes, which has been attributed to skill-biased technical progress, deunionization, and supply side effects (Dustmann et al., 2009; Antonczyk et al., 2010) . Other considerable effects come from changes in employment and changes in the tax system. Together, these three factors explain around 80 percent of the overall increase, where about one half is contributed by increasing inequality in labor incomes, and the other half is equally shared by employment changes and changes of the tax system.
By contrast, changes in household structures, household characteristics, and the transfer system seem to have played a much smaller role. The latter is in sharp contrast to the widespread view that the changes in the transfer system, which were introduced in the year 2005 within a larger set of labor market reforms ("Hartzreforms"), led to a drastic increase in inequality. In line with the results reported in Arntz et al. (2007) , our results suggest that the changes in benefits due to the "Hartz-reforms" were slightly inequality reducing rather than inequality increasing. Another interesting and policy-relevant conclusion of our analysis is that although the unprecedented inequality increase between 1999/2000 and 2005/2006 was accompanied by a steep increase in unemployment, this increase was probably only to a small extent responsible for the inequality increase. Our results rather suggest that other changes in employment patterns, especially the growth of parttime and marginal part-time work, have contributed to the overall increase. This fits with the fact that overall inequality remained at its high level after 2005, while unemployment drastically fell but part-time, marginal part-time, and general employment grew at accelerated rates. The fact that we also measure a substantial contribution coming from tax changes shows that tax reforms-which were carried out in many countries-may also have an important effect on the income distribution. Often, the motivation for such tax reforms is to avoid "fiscal drag," i.e. the automatically rising tax burden under a progressive tax schedule in the presence of inflationary income growth. Our results suggest that the tax reforms carried out in Germany not only fought fiscal drag but changed the progression structure of the tax schedule in a substantial way.
We believe that our results contribute to the understanding of recent changes in the German income distribution and possibly that of other countries. As in many other approaches, our approach has some limitations that should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. Apart from the many simplifying assumptions that have to be made when modeling the complex mechanisms of household arrangements, employment structures, labor market incomes, tax and transfer rules, the methodological setup used here is not suited to address equilibrium effects and possibly complex interactions between the different factors considered. For example, changes in the tax and transfer system may also influence labor supply decisions and therefore eventually have an impact on the distribution (via changing employment outcomes) that goes beyond the direct effect. Similarly, increasing wage differentials and more wage flexibility may eventually lead to more employment, possibly countering their direct, inequality increasing effects. These aspects should be borne in mind when interpreting our results. 
